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LAOS IN 1988 
In Pursuit of New Directions 
Martin Stuart-Fox 
The Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) took 
a long step in 1988 down the route of economic reform at home and open- 
ness to the Western bloc abroad that had been charted by the Fourth Con- 
gress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) in 1986. Under the 
so-called New Economic Mechanism (NEM), the Lao economy has been 
progressively decentralized and opened up to market forces. At the same 
time Laos has looked to the west, particularly to Thailand, for increased 
private investment, transfer of technology, and trade. After more than a 
decade of failure, the leaders of the LPDR have at last recognized the 
impossibility of moving directly to socialism "bypassing the capitalist 
phase," and instead have become enthusiastic converts to "economic re- 
structuring" and "the broadening of multiform economic cooperation with 
foreign countries." 1 
Economic Strategy and Results 
The thrust of the LPDR's economic development policy in 1988 focused 
on three main tasks: transformation of the family economy, extension of 
trade, and improvement of communications. These priorities marked a 
major change in economic direction. To the previous five sectors of the 
Lao economy-individual subsistence, collective, private capitalist, joint 
state-private, and state socialist-was added "the economy of small 
goods." Rather than move directly from subsistence to collective farming, 
peasant families are now encouraged to enter this small goods economy 
through trading surplus production for commodities. According to LPRP 
Secretary-General Kaysone Phomvihane, 82% of all Lao families are en- 
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gaged in farming, and all are now being urged to become small-scale pri- 
vate capitalists and consumers. State land is being distributed to 
individual families "in proportion to their actual labour" to encourage 
"the private economy of farmers and handicraft workers." Public land so 
allocated can be utilized "on a long-term basis" and even passed on "as an 
inheritance for their offspring," Kaysone promised in his general political 
report in February to the Supreme People's Assembly.2 Only after family 
production is boosted by these means will collective production be en- 
couraged. In fact, collectivization is now envisaged as coming about not 
through collectivizing the means of production, but through linking indi- 
vidual farming families in "trading cooperatives" to channel surplus pro- 
duction into the national economy. Higher level collectives in the form of 
production solidarity units and agricultural cooperatives would be intro- 
duced only later. 
Extension of the new autonomous management policy was also vigor- 
ously promoted during 1988, to include more than half of Laos's 377 state 
enterprises. By midyear, 186 firms had switched to "socialist business ac- 
counting." Of those, 139 published statements showing that almost two- 
thirds had succeeded in raising income and productivity, though under 
half had increased tax returns to the government.3 Incentive to perform is 
sharpened by the threat that those state enterprises which fail to show a 
profit may be sold off to private investors. Even so, change was slow and 
painful, for as Kaysone admitted, "the effects of old thinking, old mecha- 
nisms and old habits are still heavy . . . [and] the capability of cadres ... 
limited."4 
Additional economic reforms include effective control of inflation, intro- 
duction of a single exchange rate of 350 kip to the dollar, and a single price 
system. Provincial checkpoints have been abolished to promote regional 
trade, and a major banking reform is being implemented to permit the 
operation of autonomous commercial banks to loan to private and joint 
private-state enterprises. Since Lao industry does not have the capacity to 
produce the goods needed and the Vietnamese economy is in shambles, the 
Lao have turned to Thailand both for goods and investment. A new lib- 
eral investment code has been published, allowing 100% foreign owner- 
ship for a period of fifteen years, or joint ventures with a minimum of 30% 
foreign capital. The code provides guarantees against nationalization, per- 
2. Kaysone Phomvihane, Annual Political Report, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
(SWB), February 25, 1988, p. Cl/1. 
3. Marcel Barang, "Perestroika in the Vientiane Style," South, July 1988, p. 40; Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) Laos, no. 2 (1988), p. 24. 
4. Kaysone, Political Report, p. Cl/7. 
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mits remittance of salaries and profits, and allows for special tax conces- 
sions. Company tax has been set at 35% on profits of wholly foreign- 
owned firms, as against 20-30% for joint ventures. 
Results of the LPDR's economic restructuring have been somewhat dis- 
appointing to date. The drought cut agricultural production, especially 
rice, for 1987-88, and a shortfall of 70,000 tons of milled rice was ex- 
pected. Forty thousand tons were donated by Western governments, pri- 
vate aid organizations, and international agencies, with enough from 
socialist states to meet the country's requirements. Increased production 
to cover such emergencies would come through bringing a half million 
additional hectares of land into production by the year 2000, a nationwide 
agricultural conference was told.5 Industrial production also fell, and 
Laos continued to run a massive trade deficit. Only timber production 
increased in 1987, but the reported annual loss of 300,000 hectares of for- 
est through slash-and-burn farming, if unchecked, threatens the future 
prosperity of the industry. The outlook is thus mixed, but in all events 
Laos is embarked on a major reorientation of development strategy which 
takes as its immediate model not the socialist orthodoxy of Vietnam but 
the consumer capitalism of Thailand. In this it is moving further and 
faster than Vietnam, with the evident encouragement of the Soviet Union. 
Even the most serious conflict with Thailand since formation of the LPDR 
was not enough to impede more than temporarily the blossoming "multi- 
form" relationship between the two states. In fact, the "psychological vic- 
tory" gained by Laos in successfully standing up to superior Thai forces 
appears to have given the LPDR a boost of national self-confidence in its 
relations with its neighbor.6 
Turning to Thailand 
Not since the exchange of visits between leaders of the two countries in 
1979 have Lao-Thai relations been as positive as they became in 1988. Yet 
the year opened with heavy fighting along their frontier. As in the case of 
the 1984 "three villages" dispute, this conflict also erupted over differing 
interpretations of the 1907 treaty between Thailand and France defining 
the border between Sayaboury province in Laos and adjoining Thai prov- 
inces. The dispute arose when a Thai logging company working in the 
area apparently stopped bribing local Lao militia and began paying protec- 
5. Kaysone Phoumvihane, Speech to National Conference on Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Cooperatives, Vientiane, June 10, 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Re- 
port, East Asia (hereafter FBIS, DR/EA), June 13, 1988. 
6. "Thailand-Laos: Healing Strained Relations," The Nation Mid Year Review (Bangkok), 
June 1988, p. 102. 
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tion money instead to a Thai paramilitary unit. When Lao forces at- 
tempted to curtail what was described as "illegal logging operations," 
troops of the Thai Third Army Region moved in to support the loggers. 
Beginning in mid-December 1987, the Thai began mounting increasingly 
massive artillery bombardments and air strikes against Lao troops dug in 
on the contested high ground, and in February two Thai fighter aircraft 
were shot down by Lao ground-to-air missile batteries. By then the cost to 
both sides was considerable. Thailand's military expenditure stood at 
around 2 billion baht (US$80 million) and its casualties numbered 103 
dead and 802 wounded. According to Thai sources, Laos had suffered 340 
killed and 257 wounded. Both sides were ready for peace. 
The ceasefire that came into effect February 19 was arranged between 
the LPDR chief of staff, General Sisawat Keobounphan, and the Thai 
army commander, General Chaovalit Yonghaiyut, after former Thai 
Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan made two secret visits to Vientiane 
to meet with Kaysone.7 Under the agreement both sides withdrew their 
forces three kilometers, effectively demilitarizing the contested area and 
preparing the way for a third round of the inconclusive border talks that 
have been going on since 1984. Preliminary talks between official delega- 
tions soon collapsed under the weight of mutual suspicion and recrimina- 
tion. However, this did not prevent the exchange of friendship visits 
between Lao and Thai military officers and their wives. But while com- 
radely warmth characterized relations between the two countries' armed 
forces, Vientiane radio continued to criticize the Prem government and the 
Thai foreign ministry, and to accuse Thailand of continued support for 
Lao insurgents. Not surprisingly, election of a new government in Thai- 
land was welcomed in Vientiane. 
But inability to agree even upon a modus operandi for delineation of 
their disputed common border was not permitted to interfere with bur- 
geoning economic relations between the two countries. Thailand reduced 
from 273 to 30 the list of "strategic" goods that Thai companies are forbid- 
den to trade with Laos, friendship markets sprang up to facilitate cross- 
border trade, and Thai businessmen took advantage of new, relaxed regu- 
lations on foreign investment and joint ventures to invest in textiles (to get 
around U.S. quotas on Thai products), construction (the new Vientiane 
market, housing, hotels), transport (finance for import of vehicles), agri- 
culture (a rubber plantation), and tourism. In 1988 Laos was expected to 
import well above the 1987 figure of $33 million worth of Thai goods, 
7. Marcel Barang, personal communication. 
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while exporting produce and electricity to the value of around $30 mil- 
lion.8 
China, the U.S., and Japan 
The LPDR also sought friendly relations with China and the West. A 
long, warmly-worded telegram welcomed China's national day, and the 
expected exchange of ambassadors took place. Improved relations were 
directly linked by Lao spokesmen to improved security as China termi- 
nated support for Lao insurgents.9 Most Vietnamese troops have been qui- 
etly withdrawn from northern Laos, and a significant increase in the 
volume of cross-border barter trade has already been reported with 
China's Yunnan province.10 Economic relations are unlikely to progress 
much beyond this level in the foreseeable future, however, even given a 
resumption of limited Chinese aid. 
Relations with the United States did not register dramatic improvement, 
but Vientiane was sending all the right signals. Three areas of concern 
affect Lao-U.S. relations-American MIAs (servicemen still listed as 
missing-in-action during the Vietnam war), drug trafficking, and political 
prisoners. All were addressed to some extent in 1988. In February, re- 
mains of a number of American servicemen were handed over to the U.S. 
embassy, and in May a joint U.S.-Lao military team excavated the crash 
site of a reconnaissance aircraft in southern Laos, and another excavation 
was announced for December. In return, the U.S. has "acknowledged the 
legitimate humanitarian problems of Laos," and agreed to respond "within 
the limits of its capabilities."" No immediate resumption of other than 
U.S. emergency aid is foreseen, however. Another American concern that 
surfaced in 1988 was the production of opium and heroin in Laos. From 
around 50 tons of raw opium in the early 1980s, production has reportedly 
increased at least fourfold. A U.S. State Department report released in 
May implicated Laos in the illegal narcotics network, a charge the Lao 
government angrily rejected. Despite denials, however, direct proof of a 
Lao connection in international heroin trafficking came in August with the 
trial, conviction, and sentencing/expulsion of 50 persons (22 Thai of Chi- 
nese extraction, 13 Burmese, one Chinese national, and 14 Lao) accused of 
running an illegal heroin factory in Oudomxay province in northern Laos. 
8. Calculated on the basis of Thai figures, the Bangkok Post, June 22, 1988, and the confi- 
dential World Bank Report on Laos, 1988. 
9. The Nation (Bangkok), May 25, 1988. 
10. Marcel Barang, personal communication, quoting sources in Vientiane. 
11. Murray Hiebert, "Winning Friends," Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), Decem- 
ber 31, 1987. 
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A massive 242.5 kgms. of heroin and 344 kgms. of raw opium were report- 
edly seized, and Lao authorities hailed the trial as vindicating their rejec- 
tion of American charges. As for political prisoners, of more than 10,000 
originally held, only an estimated 400 remain in Houaphan province, with 
some 2,000 still in the south working on state farms and construction 
sites.12 All northern detainees were due to be freed by the end of 1988. 
Termination of "political re-education" was part of the government's effort 
to attract expatriates to return to Laos, either bringing much needed ex- 
pertise or with capital to invest. Remittances from Lao living abroad to 
family members in Laos presently amount to as much as $5 million annu- 
ally. 
There is little in Laos of interest to major U.S. companies, but the 
LPDR is making every effort to attract a diversity of investment in order 
to reduce reliance upon Thailand. Encouragement is being given to Aus- 
tralian, Swedish, French, and Japanese investment. Australia and Sweden 
continued their well-established aid programs, but important new initia- 
tives occurred in relations with France and Japan. In December 1987 
France's deputy foreign minister paid the first official visit to Laos by a 
government minister since 1975. A second delegation from the French 
Foreign Ministry arrived in June to clear the way for a resumption of 
French aid, and a French conglomerate concluded agreements for invest- 
ment in joint ventures in trade, industry, and tourism. In March Lao For- 
eign Minister Phoune Sipaseuth paid his first official visit to Japan since 
the founding of the LPDR. Phoune obtained pledges of Japanese aid 
amounting to $3 million for construction of a river port for Vientiane with 
another $3.2 million toward agricultural projects. Repayment of a previ- 
ous loan of almost $3 million was waived. Phoune was told that the level 
of Japanese aid would be further increased once a settlement was reached 
in Kampuchea, and a Japanese parliamentary delegation which visited 
Laos in June indicated that Japanese aid would be doubled over the next 
five years from the present $7.2 million (900 million yen). 
Relations with the Socialist Bloc 
Despite the new Lao openness to the West, relations with Vietnam contin- 
ued to be close and friendly. Cooperation, both bilateral with Vietnam and 
trilateral among the three countries of Indochina, continued in everything 
from "political work" in the armed forces to economic planning and for- 
eign policy, and on every level from twinned provinces and municipalities 
to national governments and ruling parties. But the oppressively close 
12. Marcel Barang, personal communication. 
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Lao-Vietnamese relationship which characterized the 1975-1985 period 
seems to have eased. Kaysone now sees himself as the senior surviving 
leader from the "thirty year revolutionary struggle," and the Lao are 
much less willing to accept Vietnamese advice given Vietnam's own polit- 
ical and economic problems. Certain other developments in 1988 suggest 
a loosening of Lao-Vietnamese ties. Actual troop withdrawals have not 
been publicized as in Kampuchea, but it is believed that at least half the 
estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Vietnamese troops have left. On the economic 
front, some barter agreements with Vietnam have apparently not been re- 
newed as provinces prefer to trade more profitably with Thailand. A third 
straw in the wind is Lao readiness to fall into line with the Soviet Union 
when differences exist between Moscow and Hanoi. A good example of 
this was Lao endorsement of the Soviet contention that since the Afghan 
and Kampuchean problems share certain similarities, similar solutions 
may be possible-a position Vietnam vehemently rejects.13 Despite this, 
however, Laos closely coordinated its approach to the Kampuchean prob- 
lem with both Hanoi and Phnom Penh. 
Lao relations with the USSR continued to be warm despite Soviet criti- 
cism of waste and inefficiency in the use of Soviet aid, which is about half 
the total foreign aid received by the LPDR. Kaysone paid a "working 
visit" to the USSR in September, where he met with Mikhail Gorbachev 
and gained the Soviet leader's endorsement for both the LPDR's economic 
reforms and its overtures to the West. Kaysone, for his part, pledged to 
increase economic cooperation with the USSR to reduce the massive trade 
imbalance. 
Political Developments 
Apart from the continuing debate over implementation of the New Eco- 
nomic Mechanism, the major political development in Laos in 1988 was 
the holding of the first elections since the regime came to power in 1975. 
Elections were scheduled on three levels-the first in June for local coun- 
cils, the second and third for provincial assemblies and for the Supreme 
People's Assembly (SPA) before the end of the year. Elections for the 79- 
member SPA will replace the National Congress of People's Representa- 
tives which has continued to sit, in the absence of any constitution, since 
being nominated in November 1975. The first order of business of an 
elected SPA is likely to be ratification of the new constitution that repre- 
13. FBIS, DR/EA, April 26, 1988; Nayan Chanda, "A Troubled Friendship," FEER, June 
2, 1988. 
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sentatives of the Drafting Committee have been discussing with Soviet ex- 
perts. 14 
In the first round, almost 1.8 million voters cast their ballots for a total 
of 4,462 candidates running for 2,410 seats in 910 local councils. In at 
least 360 seats, single candidates were elected unopposed. According to 
the Electoral Law, all candidates had to be "faithful to the country and 
socialism" and be "proposed" by the local branch of the Lao Front for 
National Construction.15 Only the Front was permitted to canvass votes 
for particular candidates, "with harmonious coordination from the party 
and state organizations . .. and national defense and public security main- 
tenance committees" (Article 4). By contrast, Article 8 states that "no 
person or group of peoples is allowed to campaign in favour of any candi- 
date ... [since] such a campaign can result in disturbances, thus violating 
the election regulations." "Democracy" in Laos remains sharply circum- 
scribed. 
A major reshuffle of government ministries occurred without public an- 
nouncement in 1988. Among other changes, a new State Committee for 
Economic Planning and Finance was formed, combining the former State 
Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance. Chairman of the pow- 
erful new committee is Politburo member Sali Vongkahmsao, with Kham- 
sai Souphanouvong, son of the ailing LPDR president, as first deputy 
chairman. The foreign component of economic development strategy has 
been made the responsibility of a new State Committee for Foreign Eco- 
nomic Relations and Trade under Phao Bounnaphon as chairman. Phao 
was formerly Minister of Transport, Communications and Posts, where he 
has been replaced by Oudom Khatthi-gna, another up-and-coming polit- 
ical figure in Laos.16 These changes in government structure and person- 
nel should be seen as additional confirmation that Laos is determined to 
press ahead with its new development strategy. How effective it proves to 
be and how relations with neighboring states, particularly Vietnam, are 
affected remains to be seen. 
14. Indochina Chronology, 7:1 (January-March, 1988), p. 13. 
15. FBIS, DR/EA, April 28, 1988. 
16. EIU Laos, no. 3 (1988), p. 18. 
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